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Abstract
Incomplete preferences over lotteries on a finite set of alternatives satisfy-
ing, besides independence and continuity, a property called bad outcome
aversion are considered. These preferences are characterized in terms
of their specific multi-expected utility representations (cf. Dubra et al.,
2004), and can be seen as generalized stochastic dominance preferences.
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1 Introduction
A familiar way to order probability distributions on a set of alternatives is to
use (first or higher degree) stochastic dominance. A typical property of such
an (incomplete) ordering or preference is that a positive probability on a bad
alternative cannot be compensated by putting high probabilities on better alter-
natives. For instance, a probability distribution that puts positive probability
on the worst alternative can never stochastically dominate another probability
distribution that puts less probability on that alternative, not even by putting
all remaining probability on a best alternative.
In this paper we study and characterize this typical property, which we call
bad outcome aversion (BOA). Specifically, we consider incomplete preferences
over lotteries on a finite set of alternatives and assume the classical conditions
of (von Neumann and Morgenstern) independence and continuity, so that the
‘multi-expected utility’ theorem of Dubra et al. (2004) applies. This result
characterizes such preferences in terms of representing closed and convex sets
of functions. Our main result (Theorem 4.3) characterizes BOA for such pref-
erences in terms of specific elements contained in these representing sets of
functions.
∗Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, PO Box 616, NL-
6200 MD Maastricht. Email addresses: h.peters@ke.unimaas.nl, t.schulteis@ke.unimaas.nl,
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Thus, our paper offers a broad generalization of stochastic dominance pref-
erences. The literature on stochastic dominance is vast: see Levy (1992) for
an overview of theory and applications. For our paper, in particular Fish-
burn (1976) is of interest. One other direct source of inspiration is our re-
cent work on an application of stochastic dominance preferences in two-person
non-cooperative games, see Perea et al. (2006); that paper, in turn, builds on
Fishburn (1978).
Section 2 formulates the model and recalls the multi-expected utility char-
acterization of Dubra et al. (2004). Section 3 studies stochastic dominance
preferences and in particular adapts Fishburn (1976) to our context. The bad
outcome aversion condition is introduced in Section 4, which also contains our
main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let X := {x1, . . . , xn}, where n ≥ 3, be a finite set of alternatives and let
∆ (X) denote the set of probability distributions (lotteries) over X. We also
use the letters x, y, . . . to denote elements of X. A preference º is a reflexive
and transitive binary relation on ∆ (X). If (p, q) ∈ º we say that p is (weakly)
preferred over q. Instead of (p, q) ∈ º we often use the notation p º q. We
write p Â q if p º q and q 6º p, and p ∼ q if p º q and q º p. For p ∈ ∆(X)
and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, pi denotes the probability that p assigns to xi, and p(x)
the probability that p assigns to x ∈ X. The degenerate lottery that assigns
probability one to the alternative x ∈ X is identified with x. Observe that we
do not require completeness of º.
The following possible conditions on º are well-known.
Axiom 2.1 (Independence) For all p, q, r ∈ ∆(X) and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
p º q ⇒ λp+ (1− λ) r º λq + (1− λ) r.
Axiom 2.2 (Continuity) For all q ∈ ∆(X), the sets {p ∈ ∆(X) | p º q} and
{p ∈ ∆(X) | q º p} are closed in ∆(X).
Let U ⊆ RX be a set of real-valued functions on X. For u ∈ RX and a lottery
p ∈ ∆(X) denote by
Eu(p) :=
n∑
i=1
piu(xi)
the expectation of p under u. We say that U represents the preference º if for
all p, q ∈ ∆(X),
p º q ⇔ Eu(p) ≥ Eu(q) for all u ∈ U.
The following ‘multi-expected utility’ theorem follows from Dubra et al. (2004)
and generalizes the familiar von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem
to incomplete preferences.
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Theorem 2.3 Let º be a preference. Then º satisfies independence and con-
tinuity if and only if there is a closed and convex set U ⊆ RX that represents
º.
3 Stochastic dominance
First degree stochastic dominance is a well-known example of a preference to
which Theorem 2.3 applies. For any permutation pi of {1, . . . , n}, the first degree
stochastic dominance preference ºpi is defined by
p ºpi q ⇔
j∑
i=1
ppi(i) ≤
j∑
i=1
qpi(i) for all j = 1, . . . , n
for all p, q ∈ ∆(X). Note that ºpi strictly orders all alternatives of X, specif-
ically, xpi(n) Âpi . . . Âpi xpi(1). So first degree stochastic dominance preferences
are complete on degenerate lotteries. Conversely, if a preference satisfies inde-
pendence and strictly orders all alternatives of X, then it contains a first degree
stochastic dominance preference. To show this formally, we introduce the fol-
lowing condition. This condition says that, ceteris paribus, shifting probability
to a better alternative makes a lottery preferable.
Axiom 3.1 (Improvement) For all p, q ∈ ∆(X) and all x, y ∈ X such that
(i) x º y, (ii) p(z) = q(z) for all z ∈ X \ {x, y}, and (iii) p(x) > q(x) and
(hence) p(y) < q(y), we have p º q.
Lemma 3.2 Let º satisfy independence. Then º satisfies improvement.
Proof. Let p, q, x, y satisfy the conditions in the statement of the improvement
axiom. Let ε := p(x)− q(x) > 0. Define p˜ ∈ ∆(X) by
p˜(z) =

1
1−εp(z) if z 6= x, y
1
1−εq(x) if z = x
1
1−εp(y) if z = y.
Then x º y implies p = εx+ (1− ε)p˜ º εy + (1− ε)p˜ = q by independence. ¥
Lemma 3.3 Let º be a preference with either x º y or y º x for all x, y ∈ X,
x 6= y. Then:
(i) There is a permutation pi of {1, . . . , n} such that xpi(n) Â . . . Â xpi(1).
(ii) º satisfies improvement if and only if ºpi ⊆ º.
Proof. Part (i) is obvious. For the ‘if’ part of (ii), consider p, q, x, y satisfying the
conditions in the statement of the improvement axiom. In particular, x = xpi(i)
and y = xpi(j) for some i > j. This implies p ºpi q, and therefore p º q.
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For the ‘only if’ part, for simplicity assume pi is identity, so that xn Â . . . Â
x1. Let p, q ∈ ∆(X) such that p 6= q and p ºpi q. Then, by definition,
j∑
i=1
pi ≤
j∑
i=1
qi for all j = 1, . . . , n. (1)
Hence, for i∗ := min {i | pi 6= qi} we have qi∗ − pi∗ > 0. For i∗ ≤ k ≤ n define
qk ∈ ∆(X) by
qki :=

pi if i ≤ k − 1
qk +
k−1∑
l=0
(ql − pl) if i = k
qi if i ≥ k + 1.
By (1), qk is well-defined, and qi
∗
= q, qn = p. Improvement and
k∑
i=1
pi ≤
k∑
i=1
qi
imply qk+1 º qk for each i∗ ≤ k ≤ n− 1, so p º q by transitivity of º. ¥
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4 Let the preference º satisfy independence. If there is a permu-
tation pi of {1, . . . , n} such that xpi(n) Â . . . Â xpi(1), then ºpi ⊆ º.
For both illustrative purposes and later reference we now extend first degree
stochastic dominance to t-degree stochastic dominance, for any t ∈ R with
t ≥ 1. This extension adapts Fishburn (1976) to our setting. We start with the
following definition.
Definition 3.5 Let t ∈ R, t ≥ 1. The n× n-matrix At is defined by (at)ij := 0
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i > j and by
(at)ij :=
Γ (t+ j − i)
(j − i)!Γ (t)
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i ≤ j. Here, Γ denotes the Γ-function
Γ (x) =
∫ ∞
0
sx−1e−sds.
The proof of the following lemma is given in the Appendix to this paper.
Lemma 3.6 For all t, t′ ∈ R, t, t′ ≥ 1, we have
At+t′ = AtAt′ .
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Lemma 3.6 implies that, if we define A := A1, then we can obtain At as A to the
power t for all t ≥ 1, and therefore we write At instead of At in the remainder
of this paper.
For t ≥ 1 we define the t-degree stochastic dominance preference ºt by
p ºt q ⇔ pAt ≤ qAt
for all p, q ∈ ∆(X), where the inequality is coordinate-wise. It is not hard to
verify that xn Ât . . . Ât x1, thus ºt strictly orders the elements of X.1 Also, º1
is the first degree stochastic dominance preference associated with this ordering
of the elements of X, i.e., º1 is equal to ºpi for pi being the identity.
The following lemma collects some further facts about t-degree stochastic
dominance. We omit the (straightforward) proofs and only note that these
facts extend similar observations about the discrete case t ∈ N, see Perea et al.
(2006).
Lemma 3.7
(i) For all t, t′ ∈ R with t ≥ t′ ≥ 1, we have ºt′ ⊆ ºt.
(ii) For all p, q ∈ ∆(X) with p 6= q, if pi∗ < qi∗ where i∗ := min {i | pi 6= qi},
then there is a t′ ≥ 1 such that p ºt q for all t ≥ t′.
This lemma implies that t-degree stochastic dominance preferences become more
complete inclusion-wise if t becomes large, and that any pair of lotteries is
eventually ordered.
The (complete) lexicographic preference ºLM is defined by
p ºLM q ⇔ p = q or pi∗ < qi∗ (2)
for all p, q ∈ ∆(X), where as before i∗ := min {i | pi 6= qi}.
The preferences ºt have the property that as t increases a (potentially small)
probability that is put on a bad outcome must be compensated by an increasing
weight on a good outcome. In the limit compensation is impossible. This is also
expressed by the following corollary to Lemma 3.7.
Corollary 3.8 For all t ∈ R, t ≥ 1, it holds that ºt ⊆ ºLM, and
∞⋃
t=1
ºt = ºLM .
Lemma 3.7 and Corollary 3.8 also imply that for any p, q ∈ ∆(X) with p 6= q
and satisfying the condition on the right hand side of (2), we have q 6ºt p
for all t ≥ 1. Hence, this is a characteristic property of stochastic dominance
preferences. In the next section we formalize this property as an axiom of
‘bad outcome aversion’ and characterize preferences that, beside continuity and
independence, satisfy this axiom.
1t-degree stochastic dominance can also be defined for different orderings of the alternatives
in X, but for simplicity we restrict all definitions here to the ordering xn Ât . . . Ât x1.
5
4 Bad outcome aversion
The following axiom captures and generalizes a basic property of stochastic
dominance preferences, as explained at the end of the preceding section.
Axiom 4.1 (Bad outcome aversion, BOA) For all p, q ∈ ∆(X) and all x ∈
X, if p(x) > q(x) and x 6º z for all z ∈ X \ {x} for which p(z) 6= q(z), then
p 6º q.
The interpretation of this axiom is as follows. Think of x as a ‘bad’ alternative,
on which p puts more weight than q. Then the axiom says that this can never
be compensated by the weights put by p on alternatives that are better or at
least not worse than x.
Clearly, by Lemma 3.7 and Corollary 3.8, stochastic dominance preferences
and the lexicographic preference ºLM satisfy BOA. More generally, for each
permutation pi of {1, . . . , n} define the lexicographic preference ºLM,pi by
p ºLM,pi q ⇔ p = q or ppi(i∗) < qpi(i∗) (3)
for all p, q ∈ ∆(X), where i∗ := min{i | ppi(i) 6= qpi(i)}. The following proposi-
tion says that a preference satisfies BOA and there there are no indifferences
between the alternatives in X if and only if it is a subset of some lexicographic
preference.
Proposition 4.2 Let º be a preference. Then the following statements are
equivalent.
(i) º satisfies BOA, and x 6∼ y for all x, y ∈ X with x 6= y.
(ii) º ⊆ ºLM,pi for some permutation pi of {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. The implication (ii)⇒ (i) is obvious. For the converse implication, take
a permutation pi such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if i > j then xpi(j) 6º xpi(i).
(Such a permutation can be seen to exist since x 6∼ y for all x 6= y in X,
although it may not be unique.) Let p, q ∈ ∆(X) with p 6= q and p º q. Let
i∗ := min
{
i | ppi(i) 6= qpi(i)
}
. Since xpi(i∗) 6º xpi(i) for all i > i∗, BOA of º implies
ppi(i∗) < qpi(i∗). Thus, p ºLM,pi q. ¥
We now characterize BOA for preferences that satisfy independence and con-
tinuity and that strictly order all elements of X, by using the multi-expected
utility theorem, Theorem 2.3. More precisely, we show that such a preference
satisfies BOA if and only if the representing class of functions contains specific
elements.
Theorem 4.3 Let the preference º satisfy independence and continuity, and
suppose xn Â xn−1 Â . . . Â x1. Let U ⊆ RX represent º. Then º satisfies
BOA if and only if for each i = 1, . . . , n−1 there is a sequence (uk)k∈N, uk ∈ U
and uk(xi) < uk(xn) for each k ∈ N, such that
lim
k→∞
uk(xn)− uk(xi+1)
uk(xn)− uk(xi) = 0 . (4)
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Proof. We may normalize any u ∈ U such that u(x1) = 0 and u(xn) = 1.
For the ‘if’ part, let p, q, x satisfy the conditions in the statement of BOA,
so x = xi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Let (uk)k∈N be a sequence with uk ∈ U
and uk(xi) < uk(xn) for each k ∈ N such that (4) is satisfied. Without loss
of generality we may assume that the sequence (uk)k∈N converges. With α :=∑i−1
j=1 qj =
∑i−1
j=1 pj we can write
lim
k→∞
Euk(q) = lim
k→∞
i−1∑
j=1
qju
k(xj) + qiuk(xi) + (1− qi − α)uk(xi+1)
and
lim
k→∞
Euk(p) = lim
k→∞
i−1∑
j=1
pju
k(xj) + piuk(xi) + (1− pi − α) .
We claim that for k sufficiently large, Euk(q) > Euk(p). To show this, it is
sufficient to prove that
qiu
k(xi) + (1− qi − α)uk(xi + 1) > piuk(xi) + (1− pi − α)
or, equivalently
(1− qi − α)[1− uk(xi+1)] < (pi − qi)[1− uk(xi)]
for k sufficiently large. This, however, follows by (4). So p 6º q.
For the converse, assume that º satisfies BOA. Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Fix
0 < pi < 1, consider the lottery p = pixi+(1−pi)xi+1, and for each 0 < ε < 1−pi
consider the lottery pε = (pi + ε)xi + (1 − pi − ε)xn. By BOA, pε 6º p, hence
there is a uε ∈ U such that uε(p) > uε(pε), i.e.,
(1− pi)(1− uε(xi+1)) < ε(1− uε(xi)) .
This implies the existence of a sequence (uk)k∈N with uk ∈ U and uk(xi) <
uk(xn) for each k ∈ N such that (4) is satisfied. ¥
We conclude this section with some remarks and a corollary for the case of three
alternatives.
Remark 4.4 A consequence of Theorem 4.3 is that, under the additional con-
ditions in the theorem, BOA implies incompleteness of the preference. This is
so because a complete preference is represented by a unique 0 − 1 normalized
function and, thus, a sequence satisfying (4) cannot exist for every i.
Remark 4.5 If, in Theorem 4.3, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} there is a function
u ∈ U with u(xi) < u(xi+1) = . . . = u(xn), then (4) can be trivially satisfied
by taking uk = u for all k ∈ N. For example, let n = 4 and consider the set of
functions
U = conv{(0, η, η(2− η), 1) ∈ R4 | 0 ≤ η ≤ 1} ,
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where ‘conv’ denotes the convex hull operator. This set is closed and convex.
It contains the elements (0, 1, 1, 1) and (e.g.) (0, 12 ,
1
2 , 1), so that (4) is satisfied
for i = 1 and i = 3. It does not contain an element of the form (0, α, 1, 1) for
some 0 ≤ α < 1, but (e.g.) the sequence (0, kk+1 , k(k+2)(k+1)2 , 1)k∈N satisfies (4) for
i = 2. It follows that the preference represented by U satisfies BOA.
Remark 4.6 Theorem 4.3 applies in particular to stochastic dominance prefer-
ences ºt, t ∈ R, t ≥ 1. In that case for the set U we can take the convex hull of
the columns of the matrix −At. This is a case in which for each i = 1, . . . , n− 1
there is a function u with u(xi) < u(xi+1) = . . . = u(xn) as in Remark 4.5,
namely the i-th column of −At.
Remark 4.7 For the case of three alternatives the consequences of Theorem
4.3 are as follows. Since we can assume that every u ∈ U has the form (0, α, 1),
the theorem applied for i = 1 implies (0, 1, 1) ∈ U and the theorem applied for
i = 2 implies (0, α, 1) ∈ U for some α < 1. Let α∗ := inf{α | (0, α, 1) ∈ U}, then
convexity and closedness of U imply that U is the convex hull of (0, 1, 1) and
(0, α∗, 1). Consider, on the other hand, the 3× 3-matrix −At and normalize its
columns. This results in the matrix 0 0 01 t−1t tt+2
1 1 1
 ,
implying that the class of functions U t representing ºt is the convex hull of
(0, 1, 1) and (0, (t− 1)/t, 1) if t ≥ 2 and of (0, 1, 1) and (0, t/(t+ 2), 1) if t ≤ 2.
In turn, this implies that º coincides with ºt, where t = 1/(1− α∗) if α∗ ≥ /2
and t = 2α∗/(1 − α∗) if α∗ ≤ 1/2. Thus, we have the following corollary to
Theorem 4.3.
Corollary 4.8 Let X = {x1, x2, x3} and let º satisfy independence, continuity,
and BOA. Let x3 Â x2 Â x1. Then º = ºt for some t ∈ R, t ≥ 1.
5 Concluding remarks
(1) Although there is no direct formal connection, bad outcome aversion is
somewhat similar in flavor to risk aversion. It is well-known that first degree
stochastic dominance has the set of all functions (respecting the order on the
alternatives in X) as representing set – this can be seen, for instance, by con-
sidering the matrix −A1 – and that for second degree stochastic dominance
this is the set of all concave, ‘risk averse’ functions, i.c., the set of all functions
exhibiting decreasing differences.
(2) One could say that higher degree stochastic dominance corresponds to higher
bad outcome aversion or, more generally, that º′ is more bad outcome averse
than º if º1 ⊆ º ⊆ º′ ⊆ ºLM, cf. Corollary 3.4 and Proposition 4.2. As
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an application of this, Perea et al. (2006) study the effects of this notion of
‘increasing bad outcome aversion’, expressed by t-degree stochastic dominance
preferences for increasing t, on the equilibria of finite two-player games, where
the players have incomplete preferences on the probability distributions resulting
from their mixed strategies. It is shown that such equilibria converge to a
pair of pure strategies that are max-min in a specific sense: in the limit, each
player plays a pure strategy that is max-min in terms of the preferences of the
opponent. It can be shown that the results in that paper and in particular the
asymptotic result remain true if players become ‘more bad outcome averse’ in
the more general sense described above. Proofs can be found in Schulteis (2007).
Appendix: proof of Lemma 3.6
Let i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} and j ≥ i. We have to show
Γ (t+ t′ + j − i)
(j − i)!Γ (t+ t′) =
j∑
l=i
Γ (t+ l − i)
(l − i)!Γ (t)
Γ (t′ + j − l)
(j − l)!Γ (t′) .
We introduce the shift of indices k := l − i and the variable ξ := j − i. Hence
we have to show
Γ (t+ t′ + ξ)
ξ!Γ (t+ t′)
=
ξ∑
k=0
Γ (t+ k)
k!Γ (t)
Γ (t′ + ξ − k)
(ξ − k)!Γ (t′) . (5)
Since ξ is a natural number and the Gamma-function has the property
xΓ (x) = Γ (x+ 1)
for all real and positive x, we have
Γ (x+ ξ)
Γ (x)
= (x+ ξ − 1) (x+ ξ − 2) · . . . · x,
which is a polynomial of degree ξ in the variable x. Hence, the RHS of (5) is a
polynomial of degree ξ in (t+ t′). In the LHS of (5) there are terms tk (t′)ξ−k
for all k = 0, . . . , ξ. Hence, this LHS is a polynomial of degree ξ in the variables
t and t′. Thus, both sides are polynomials of degree ξ in the two variables t
and t′. Furthermore, from the representation for natural t as given in Perea et
al. (2006) it follows that the polynomials are equal for t, t′ ∈ N. Take any fixed
t ∈ N. We obtain two polynomials of degree ξ in t′ that coincide at infinitely
many points (all natural t′) and hence, these polynomials are equal for all t′ ∈ R,
t ≥ 0. Next, we take any t′ ∈ R, t′ ≥ 0, and obtain two polynomials of degree
ξ in t that coincide on infinitely many points (all natural t) and hence, these
polynomials are equal for all t ∈ R, t ≥ 0. This completes the proof. ¥
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